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Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan was conceived in difficult circumstances.1 He had watched 
his country struggle though civil war, battered by social unrest and torn asunder in theological 
turmoil. If Hobbes had overtly questioned the political relevance of religion, or banished 
doctrinal confession to the private realm (as John Locke would so ably argue), he would have 
been offering some version of that familiar modern solution “separation of church and state.” But 
curiously, Hobbes preferred to solve the problem of religion with stronger religion: a theocracy. 
In his Christian world, there was only one denomination which consistently claimed to represent 
God himself to his people. So Hobbes needed Roman Catholic authority, and would not rest until 
his Civil Sovereign had been invested as the Pope – prophet, priest, and king. 
Hobbes’ 20th century acolyte, Carl Schmitt, thought similarly. Schmitt’s works were also 
provoked by social and political unrest; he wasted no time in blaming Protestantism and its 
unmanageable progeny, political liberalism and laissez-faire economics. He proposed as antidote 
a centralized authority concentrated in representative Sovereignty, equipped to create, interpret, 
and enforce law, define friends against enemies, demand unqualified obedience for unlimited 
protection, crush dissent and quell dispute. This “decisionist” political form could (and perhaps 
should) exist in society as secularized power, but Schmitt insisted that at root it was derived from 
a specific theological framework – that exhibited by the conservative Roman Catholic Church. 
Both men came to the same conclusion, and used the same church as inspiration and 
model. But Schmitt was a convinced Roman Catholic, a serious and sincere advocate. Hobbes, 
on the other hand, excoriated the Pope and mocked Catholic devotion. What is most significant 
then is their apparent consensus on a point obviously not predicated upon either personal 
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conviction or formal affiliation: Politics is theological, and statesmen should merely consider 
which theology is best suited to their ends. For these two thinkers separated by circumstances, 
centuries, cultures, and a continent, nothing was more obvious than the fact that specific 
theological patterns fostered liberalism and others promoted illiberalism. They took great pains 
to select the latter over the former.  
A Few Clarifications 
 This unorthodox interpretation of Hobbes’ work may provoke a few obvious objections 
which deserve some preliminary clarification.  First, I do not wish to argue that Thomas Hobbes 
was a Roman Catholic, that he approved of the Roman Catholic Church, or that the Roman 
Catholic Church approved of him, all of which is immediately refuted by historical and empirical 
evidence. Hobbes deplored superstition, questioned revelation, refused to conceal his disdain for 
clerics of all persuasions, and in spite of obsequious protests to the contrary, persisted in various 
theological pronouncements and private interpretations of Scripture which are obviously outside 
the bounds of traditional Christianity, leading many scholars to assume that he was agnostic or 
perhaps even atheist, despite his formal Anglican affiliation. 
 What Hobbes actually believed in the depth of his heart is of no concern here, but his 
formal convictions are highly relevant politically, and by no means theologically impartial. 
Hobbes criticized the Catholics and Protestants in unequal measure, for instance. His scorn for 
Presbyterian insubordination, protests against authority, and demands for accountability, was 
substantive and principled. His animosity toward Catholic power, however, was focused more 
upon perceived usurpation rather than fundamental error, suggesting that he had a stronger 
Catholic sensibility than Protestant. Moreover, it is somewhat implausible that a man so 
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deliberate and precise in his adoption of definitions, names, and symbols would carelessly or 
inadvertently identify his Civil Sovereign with Catholic titles, office, and rank. Seething 
resentments aside, Hobbes had a profound philosophic affinity for the authority which was 
claimed, however improperly, by Rome. 
 Secondly, I do not argue that the Roman Catholic Church is an inherently illiberal 
institution, or that all Roman Catholics are politically illiberal. This is a sensitive issue, and one 
which is complicated by the proudly unequivocal statements of Catholics such as Carl Schmitt, 
that their religion is by nature incompatible with liberalism. Perhaps it is sufficient to state that 
there are also celebrated Roman Catholics who have maintained the opposite,
2
 and many more 
among the ranks of laity (particularly in America) who quietly hold a liberal understanding of 
faith and governance. The political implications of official Roman Catholic doctrine have always 
been subject to prevalent culture, both inside and outside the Church, and determined by 
historical circumstance and expediency. 
 The Roman Catholic Church is ancient and august, but no monolith, either in the totality 
of its history or in any particular time period. From the Patristic era up to the high-Middle Ages, 
for instance, the Church enjoyed a liberal aspect of “doctrinal pluralism”3 very similar to that old 
Roman/Greco culture of philosophic “disputation” which so infuriated Thomas Hobbes.4 And it 
is quite possible to argue that this last century has ushered in a new Roman Catholic liberalism, 
one which signals a renewal and return to this ancient path. But what happened in the middle was 
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reactionary – first to ecclesiastical confusion at Avignon (1378-1414), and then violently to the 
Protestant Reformation (1517), that cataclysm which divided the Church along a strained fault 
line and, with Hegelian force, drove both parties away from each other toward extremes, liberal 
and illiberal. This is the historical and philosophical context in which Thomas Hobbes writes. 
 As to the term “liberalism,” definition is difficult, not least because its distinguishing 
marks have often been better perceived and communicated by opponents than adherents. More 
complicated still, liberalism expresses a philosophic approach to governance which transcends 
religious dialogue, oversteps the misleading dichotomy “liberal/conservative,” and probably 
predates the modern era in which the movement was formally named. Most problematic of all, 
the usual themes associated with liberalism – personal freedoms and rights, emphasis upon 
“consent,” equality, natural law – have many times been championed by those who oppose 
liberalism, a disconcerting overlap of terms which suggests that the debate between liberals and 
illiberals is fought over location and arrangement of fundamental principles rather than the 
principles themselves.  
 The battle is over freedom – the power to decide what is good (immaterial), and the 
power to do it (material). Both parties agree that the final goal is a “right,” “correct,” or “ideal” 
ordering of our lives, both distinguish between individual and collective realizations of that 
“right,” and both argue that certain political arrangements encourage certain realizations while 
impeding others. In other words, liberals and illiberals share the use of the terms “individual,” 
“collectivity,” and “right;” they simply disagree upon location. Liberalism arranges them – right, 
individual, collectivity – reflecting a primary confidence in the individual, to decide for himself 
what is right and to attain it. The collectivity exists in order to support, encourage, and enable the 
proper environment in which individuals may continue to do so, relatively unmolested.  
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Illiberalism arranges the terms – right, collectivity, individual – reflecting a primary 
confidence in the collectivity, to decide for individuals what is right and to attain it for them. The 
individual exists in order to support, encourage, and enable the proper environment in which the 
collectivity may continue to do so. Whether solitary actors are entirely swallowed up into the 
aggregate (Rousseau), or permitted to snatch the crumbs left over after an authoritarian orgy 
(Hobbes), illiberalism always demands that the individual serve the collective first. And whether 
the collectivity is completely shattered in anarchic individualism (Thoreau), or retained as a 
grudging last resort against the dysfunctional who persist in behaving more like wild animals 
than humans (Locke), liberalism always demands that the collective serve the individual first. 
In this fight for freedom, both sides consider themselves to be victorious, which is a 
particularly counterintuitive point for certain liberals who blithely assume that they own 
“liberty,” and claim (with supercilious fanfare) all its attendant rights, privileges, and 
superiorities. The labels “liberal” and “illiberal,” however helpful, are derived from framing the 
given debate in only one of many possible ways. It is only if we define “liberty” and “authority” 
in a completely materialistic fashion, as the exercise or absence of physical power, and only if 
we orient those said terms in relation to the individual rather than any other entity – only then is 
one perspective aptly described as “liberal,” and a champion of liberty, or “libertarian.” Only 
then is the opposite viewpoint considered “illiberal,” a champion of authority, or “authoritarian.” 
Hobbes on Liberty 
 Thomas Hobbes was a perceptive man; he strongly disapproved of slanted liberal 
definitions. By his calculations, the exercise of liberty cannot long survive the absence of 
authority. In this sense then, formidable authority figures generally promote the cause of 
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freedom, while those who clamor for “too great Liberty”5 quickly find themselves with none at 
all.
6
 Frustrated with declarations to the contrary, and appalled at the hopeless mess of 
misunderstandings cluttering the proper definition of freedom, Hobbes wrote his Leviathan as a 
defense of illiberal liberty, to set the political record straight, propose a peaceful solution for 
conflict, and above all to correct popular assumptions about liberty and liberalism which even 
then were common enough. 
 It is inaccurate, for instance, to confuse liberalism with democracy, or to assume that 
under democratic governance, people enjoy liberty, “but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.”7 
Hobbes blamed the ancient “democratical” writers for this suggestion, particularly Aristotle, who 
allegedly wrote that, “In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for ‘tis commonly held, that no 
man is Free in any other Government.”8 Hobbes shortly countered that the amount of freedom is 
the same, “whether a Commonwealth by Monarchical, or Popular” rule. As long as the ultimate 
political authority can be wielded without check, it simply does not matter whether the 
arrangement is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. Hobbes generously adds, “Of the three 
sorts, which is best, is not to be disputed.”9   
 They must on no account be mixed, however. Various combinations of all three elements 
(such as the republican structures established by the American founders) divide pure authority 
and prevent any one dynamic, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, from acting in 
an unaccountable or unilateral manner. Hobbes hated these mixed forms, which he angrily 
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dubbed “mixarchy.”10 They automatically built into politics a culture of conflict, warfare, and 
dysfunction, when the intended aim of governance, by almost anyone’s estimation, was peace 
and order without which freedom could not exist. In the very interests of liberty, “Sovereign 
Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, 
and Aristocratical Commonwealths,” must be made “as great, as possibly men can be imagined 
to make it.”11 
 The liberty which Hobbes enumerates is collective, not individual. The Commonwealth is 
free to judge, to legislate, to punish, to resist and invade, but the freedom of “Particular men,” to 
act apart or against the collectivity, is another matter. Hobbes states that this liberty depends 
upon “the Silence of the Law. In cases where the Sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the 
Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion.”12 But since the 
Sovereign has the theoretical right to pronounce on all matters, this liberty could be very limited 
indeed. If freedom is the power to decide what is good (immaterial), and the power to do it 
(material), Hobbes gives the collectivity, represented in its Sovereign, absolute freedom. He 
grants individuals the remainder (if there is one): a conditional and derivative freedom. 
 Among the inevitable liberal howls of protest at this formula, Hobbes seems most 
bemused by their vaunted ability to choose what is right. The power of every man to perceive by 
reason what is best for him, to obey its dictates, and pursue its prize – this is the very source and 
fount of all individualist sympathies.  And Hobbes eagerly agrees that “all the voluntary actions 
of men tend to the benefit of themselves” – they do so at the behest of “Reason, which dictateth 
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to every man his own good.”13 The actions which men voluntarily do proceed from the will, and 
therefore “they proceed from liberty…Yet, because every act of man’s will, and every desire, 
and inclination proceedeth from some cause…they proceed from necessity.”14 Hobbes can’t 
fathom how it is possible to derive a concept of unbridled liberty from that of “necessity.” 
We are not free to act apart from our strongest desire. We are not free to desire that which 
is not in our interest. We are not free to move if deterred by external impediments. And we are 
not free to do anything at all if God has not willed it.
15
 Even naturally, men may begin in 
“freedom,” but with each passing minute of their lives, with each desire and deliberation and 
action, they lose more and more of it.
16
 This entire theme of determinism was a particularly cruel 
and clever attack on the predominately Calvinist liberals of his day. Hobbes’ thorough insistence 
on this point, combined with frequent statements on God’s salvific sovereignty and man’s 
miserable state,
17
 has understandably misled many scholars (and contemporaries) into thinking 
him some sort of Calvinist – possibly a nasty, brutish one. 
But Jonathan Edwards said, not so. The 18
th
 century American theologian wrote a short 
philosophic treatise on the Freedom of the Will in which he answered certain objections to his 
Calvinist doctrine of necessity, among them that “it agrees with the opinions of Mr. Hobbes.” 
Edwards wrote, “We need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely 
because it was once held by some bad man,” and quickly added that “the Arminians agree with 
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Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvinists.”18 Jacobus Arminius was a 17th century 
Dutch theologian who affirmed that man had the power to turn toward salvation on his own 
accord, by his own “free-will.” The Calvinists, by contrast, denied man this ability and 
consistently maintained that he is by nature “totally depraved,” bound in sin, and entirely at 
God’s mercy. 
Hobbes on Pessimism and Fear 
Hobbes’ dark diagnosis was faux Calvinist. His “ill condition” wherein all men by nature 
desire what is not theirs and engage in competitive, grasping, relentless, inevitable war of all 
against all,
19
 his state of misery in which all men by nature know the Laws of Nature but refuse 
to keep them,
20
 his reign of inescapable terror, pride, revenge, and violence – all of this goes 
away like a bad dream. With mild nonchalance, Hobbes presents “a possibility to come out of 
it,” partly by man’s passions, partly through his reason.21 Man can save himself; he can reorient 
his “passions” away from strife toward peace, he can rest content with fewer goods and less 
liberty, he can live in harmony with others and rely on their good faith to do the same. For 
Hobbes confidently believes in “the goodness of a man’s own natural Reason.”22  
His notorious pessimism is a response to man’s “State of Nature,” which exists as a 
possible rather than necessary threat. But man’s reason is not entirely defunct – he can be 
reasoned with; he can be convinced that his “natural” behavior is self-destructive, and be turned 
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from enmity toward amity. This conviction is central to Hobbes’ thought, and it is breathtakingly 
optimistic. It is also the philosophic bedrock of all grand illiberal programs for social and 
political reconstruction. Those who believe that man can be persuaded, cajoled, misled, molded 
and/or forced to appreciate what is good for him, tend to approve of strong centralized incentives 
to that end. The perfectibility of mankind, both collective and individual, lies tantalizingly within 
grasp and begs only the proper impetus to drive men in grateful droves toward their salvation. 
Fear is all that is required. According to Hobbes, men will not voluntarily lay down their 
arms, relinquish their rights, or surrender freedom without “fear of some evil consequence.”23 
Whether he sincerely believed in the so-called “State of Nature,” or even in man’s alleged 
brutishness, Hobbes could only justify the absolute power of his Sovereign if the alternative was 
obviously far worse.
24
 So where his arch-nemeses taught the populace “to hate monarchy,”25 
Hobbes enjoined monarchy – a focused and centralized authority with absolute power. He 
impressed upon them fear of freedom, fear of others, and fear of themselves,
26
 triggering an 
urgent demand for “protection” in order to ask an otherwise outrageous price for it: unqualified 
obedience.
27
 
There will always be those, however, who fear God more than man.
28
 Hobbes solemnly 
concedes that “the gods were first created by human  ear,”29 and that in the absence of a strong 
Civil Sovereign, men can rely on no other mainstay for their peace than “fear of that Invisible 
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Power, which they every one Worship as God.”30 But for him, fear of an invisible God is 
obviously not sufficient to reduce petulant subjects to unified obedience and worship, else it 
would be manifest. Hobbes insists instead upon fear of a visible God, a tangible, physical, 
immanent Power, a personal deity close at hand and within our midst,  a “great Leviathan, or 
rather (to speak more reverently)…that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, 
our peace and defense.”31 
Hobbes on Religion in Politics 
This is the turning point of Leviathan, and all else falls under the shadow cast by such a 
formidable ecclesiastical aegis. Whether Hobbes liked religion, believed in religion, or wanted it, 
he needed it. In Behemoth he wearily confessed, “‘Tis not in man’s power to suppress the power 
of religion,”32 and such statements have led many to interpret the theological sections of 
Leviathan (well over half the book) as a condescending gesture of resignation to the culture in 
which he lived and a valiant effort to turn it toward his ends. This conventional analysis is 
generally accompanied by bowdlerized reconstructions of the work which marginalize the 
religious content in order to present the purely secularist vision Hobbes no doubt wished to 
render, had he been free to do so.  
But Leviathan reads in exactly the opposite fashion; theological symbolism and 
Scriptural exegesis dominate the “secularist” bits. Moreover, religion imparts to the Civil 
Sovereign a holy aura of mystique, awe, reverence, and worship which is indispensable to 
Hobbes’ specifically illiberal scheme. The governed owe no flatly economic expression of 
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contractual consent to their Sovereign – they owe him trembling gratitude, abject prostration, and 
unconditional surrender, because he literally saved them from themselves. Hobbes found from  
Scripture that “To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively against special Evils, or 
absolutely, against all Evil, comprehending Want, Sickness, and Death itself.”33 He extrapolated 
from this that Sovereign is he who has power either “to save, or destroy,”34 he in whom all men 
therefore live and move and have their being.
35
  
Secularist legitimacy based solely upon “consent” can never adequately capture this 
heightened role of the-state- as-Savior. But in fact most illiberal programs heavily rely upon 
similar theological formulas in order to communicate the Messianic nature of their salvific 
character. These crusades often express strong moral indignance over the gross sins of 
individuals, and offer hope and redemptive grace through the auspices of the State. Strong 
overtures of care, protection, and provision are extended to the collectivity, usually at the 
expense of personal liberty and private initiative, both of which are generally viewed as 
insubordinate threats to the wellbeing of the community. Hobbes’ Leviathan stands solidly 
within this larger tradition of illiberal political theology.  
Hobbes on Corporate Salvation 
The concept of corporate security is an ancient one, particularly from the vantage of 
religion. St. Cyprian (4
th
 century) famously thundered, “Extra Ecclesia nulla sallus,” or “There is 
no salvation outside the Church.” His statement was memorable, but hardly sensational; 
Christianity has always conditioned the faithful to highly prize the safety of God’s community, 
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beyond which is outer darkness, weeping and gnashing of teeth, chaos, violence, and terror.
36
 
The precise definition of this community, however, is entirely subject to debate. The Protestants, 
for instance, who fled the Church in order to form their own, continued to maintain that salvation 
resides within the church, but they were also compelled to define “church” in a more carefully 
creative manner. The arena outside which no man can be saved could be regarded more spiritual 
than physical. 
But in the late Middle Ages, the opposite interpretation had gained traction. Pope 
Boniface VIII (Unam Sanctam, 1302) expanded on Cyprian’s remark: “We declare, say, define, 
and pronounce that it is absolutely necessary for the salvation of every human creature to be 
subject to the Roman Pontiff.” By this and other similar pronouncements, the Church was 
beginning to prohibit nuanced, spiritual definitions of God’s community, deny the possibility of 
pleasing God outside the physical confines of the Church, and condemn any expressions of faith 
which did not also include unqualified submission to the Pope. The mode was twofold: to 
emphasis visible realities over invisible, and to subject all of what was visible to one earthly 
Sovereign. 
Thomas Hobbes employs this same strategy and also has no compunction moving beyond 
it. He can’t completely deny the invisible, nor denigrate the power of personal and private 
belief,
37
 but he does categorically insist that “the Kingdom of God is real, not a metaphorical 
Kingdom; and so taken, not only in the Old Testament, but the New.”38 His theological stances 
share in that same well-documented spirit of materialism of Leviathan Part I,
39
 so much so that 
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Hobbes often overreaches: “God is great, but it is impossible to understand greatness without a 
body. Not even the Nicene Council defined it that God is incorporeal.”40 Throughout the work, 
his primary aim is to drag God and all things intangible (such as faith, judgment, natural law, 
power, authority, goodness, justice, unity, peace, etc.) out of the shadows of spiritual invisibility 
into the “clearer light” of physical visibility.41 
Hobbes on Divine Right and Representation 
Hobbes’ secondary aim is to subject all this visible matter to centralized authority. He 
does not conceal his own personal preference for monarchy over the other two political 
structures, and he consistently maintains that “the right of all sovereigns, is derived originally 
from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed.”42 Much has been made of this 
voluntary, and popular, nomination in Hobbes’ thought, but far less of his accompanying premise 
that the political monarchy embodies “the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by 
their own consent.”43 Hobbes is painfully clear on this matter: “Christian kings have their civil 
power from God immediately.”44 They govern “by Divine Right; that is, by authority immediate 
from God,” or “jure divino.”45 
There is no question that the civil Sovereign represents the Commonwealth, in a highly 
secular, consent-based manner.
46
 But according to Hobbes, this representation is simply a 
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political secularization of an ancient religious precedent whereby God “reigneth by his Vicar, or 
Lieutenant.”47 God is King, and Hobbes does not prevaricate on this point: “Whether men will or 
not, they must be subject always to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence 
of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke.”48 Men must not, however, directly 
interact with the Deity, as if they were all individually beckoned into the throne room of God. 
“There is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth God’s Person; 
which none doth but God’s Lieutenant, who hath Sovereignty under God.”49 
The representative of God is accorded such deference, obedience, and worship,
50
 that for 
all practical intents and purposes, “God’s Person on Earth”51 is treated as if he were God. The 
Reformation Protestants always regarded this “vicar” premise a purely semantic sleight of hand, 
and often claimed that the Pope was antichrist. But Hobbes finds this accusation hysterical and 
groundless: “Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essential marks; One, that he denieth 
Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himself to be Christ…Now seeing the Pope of 
Rome, neither pretendeth himself, nor denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can 
be called Antichrist.”  Hobbes’ generous defense of Rome on this point highlights a fundamental 
congruity of role between his Civil Sovereign and the Pope; they both maintain their right to give 
laws, “not as Christ, but as for Christ, wherein there is nothing of The Antichrist.”52  
Christ himself was a representative of God. Hobbes is very careful not to deny the deity 
of Christ, but he never overtly asserts it either. His notorious formulation of the Trinity has God 
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being “represented” by three persons: the  ather (by Moses), the Son (by Christ), and the Holy 
Spirit (by the apostles and their successors).
53
 This provocative definition implies that Moses, 
Christ, and the apostles enjoyed economic equality; it may also insinuate an ontological equality, 
although Hobbes never says so directly. Doctrinal peculiarities aside, what is most important 
here for his thought regards a rather compelling argument which is also held by the Church of 
Rome: At no point has God ever governed, revealed himself, or communicated to his people 
except by the mediation of some personal representative – who is therefore authoritative. 
Hobbes draws a line of unbroken succession all the way from Abraham, through Moses, 
the High Priests, Judges, Kings, Prophets, Jesus Christ, Apostles, and ecclesiastical successors to 
the Apostles, to the first Christian monarch Constantine.
54
 From that momentous 4
th
 century 
transfer point onward, God is now forever “Personated” by civil monarchs, in whom is therefore 
“all authority, both in Religion, and Policy.”55 Hobbes insists that the heated collision of Pope 
and monarch through the ages merely reinforces this truth about God’s representation: “If the 
Kingdom of God…were not a Kingdom which God by his Lieutenants, or Vicars, who deliver 
his Commandments to the people, did exercise on Earth; there would not have been so much 
contention, and war, about who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many Priests 
have troubled themselves with Spiritual Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied it them.”56 
Hobbes shares with the Roman Catholic Church an interest in proving the legitimacy of 
representative mediation throughout Scripture, with heavy emphasis upon the Old Testament. He 
is also particularly eager to demonstrate that all of God’s Old Testament representatives were 
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also Civil Sovereigns (Moses and the High Priests included)
57
 nominated by popular consent.
58
 
But the larger concern here is obviously one for tradition, for precedent, and for continuity. With 
Rome, Hobbes is arguing that God established this pattern from the beginning, and that it ought 
therefore to continue in perpetuity. According to Scripture, “the Scribes and Pharisees sit in 
Moses’ chair, and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do.” By this 
reasoning, all successors to Moses through the ages deserve the same “simple obedience.”59 
Hobbes on Simple Obedience 
“Simple obedience” is blind; it is the sort of abject surrender exhibited by “those that are 
subject to Paternal or Despotical Dominion,” either children or slaves.60 Hobbes has in mind a 
specific religious culture as well – that of “Monks, and  riars, that are bound by Vow to that 
simple obedience to their Superior, to which every Subject ought to think himself bound by the 
Law of Nature to the Civil Sovereign.”61 As subjects, Hobbes demands that we “Captivate our 
Understanding and Reason,” that we “speak, as (by lawful Authority) we are commanded,” and 
that we “live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and  aith reposed in him that speaketh, though 
the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the words spoken.”62 We must literally become 
like children in order to enter the kingdom. 
 This relinquishment is voluntary and deliberate. No matter how smart, perceptive, 
discriminating, or wise any individual might be, he willing gives it up – he submits his will and 
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his judgment to another, who will judge and act for him.
63
 In this sense, “every particular man is 
Author of all the Sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his 
Sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse 
any man but himself.”64 For Hobbes there is only one truly inalienable right which can never be 
transferred or resigned: man’s primal urge to protect his life.  aced with sure death, even justly 
by the hand of his Sovereign, he may resist. “He is totally Excused” from his legal obligations 
“because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation.”65 
 or this reason, the prospect of war presents Hobbes with a thorny dilemma. “No man is 
bound…either to kill himself or any other man,” so in “many cases” a subject may justly refuse 
to follow his Sovereign into battle.
66
 These “many cases” are actually quite few in number, but 
for certain scholars, the damage is already done; to concede even the possibility of thoughtful, 
self-interested insubordination is to effectively dismantle the power of illiberal Sovereignty. 
Hobbes’ “simple obedience” collapses under the pressure of a million individual interests, 
suddenly empowered to judge their Sovereign’s “protection” against subjective and introspective 
appraisals of “safety.” The fact that Leviathan’s gloriously logical integrity breaks down and is 
rendered almost completely incomprehensible upon such a reading should be caution enough. 
Only a shrewd liberal would interpret Hobbes in this manner; the vulnerability is simply 
too irresistible not to exploit. The various themes of “self-interest,” “obedience for protection,” 
and “contractual obligation,” combined with the celebrated test example from the battlefield – all 
these points could be juxtaposed in such a way as to severely undermine Hobbes’ otherwise 
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glowing illiberal credentials and expose him as a “proto-liberal.” But nothing could be further 
from his intention, and Hobbes himself anxiously clarifies: “When the defense of the 
commonwealth requireth at once the help of all…everyone is obliged, because otherwise the 
institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in 
vain.”67 He is so alarmed by the prospect of misinterpretation on this point that he strongly 
reiterates it in the final chapter of the work. 
“Every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority by 
which he is himself protected in time of peace.”68 Only the horrible reality of “present death,” 
only the brutal immediacy of flying bullets and fallen comrades could possibly dissuade a man 
from the privilege of defending his Sovereign. It may seem absurd that he would not consider 
potential dangers or risks until the gun were pointed at his head; it may seem ridiculous that he 
would ignore the warning signs implied in a declaration of war; it may seem unreasonable that he 
would not try to evade the enlistment or resist military engagement until he was in the very heat 
of battle. It may seem incredible that individuals would not regard rampant corruption, or 
economic failure, or high taxation, or increased crime, or international pressures, or domestic 
incompetence as a lapse in promised protection. But this is precisely what Hobbes is arguing.  
To appreciate why requires sympathy and a full appreciation of the unique illiberal 
culture “simple obedience.” To obey like a child or slave is not to question or review or judge. 
For Hobbes, the period of self-interested scrutiny exists in the State of Nature, but once the ink 
has dried on the contract of obligation, it is neither rational nor legal to weigh one’s options or 
flirt with rebellion. Certainly “the Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last 
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as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.”69 But “who 
shall Judge? Shall a private man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience?”70 Hobbes’ 
“simple obedience” demands a religious fervor of blind belief in the substance of protection 
hoped for, the evidence of which may often be unseen – “in sum, Trust, and Faith, reposed in 
him” who has pledged. 
Hobbes on Roman Catholicism 
Hobbes needed religion. He needed the fear of God driven into the hearts of grateful and 
cringing subjects. He also needed the very specific power of post-Reformation Roman 
Catholicism. No other wing of Christianity embodied that uncompromising animus of absolute 
ecclesiastical sovereignty. No other persuasion communicated that severe intolerance for 
“private interpretations.” No other faith expressed that holy horror of dissent – so Thomas 
Hobbes coveted Roman Catholic authority with greedy resentment. Protestant authority was an 
oxymoron, with its culture of rebellion, dispute, and so-called “liberty of conscience.” While 
Hobbes loathed Protestantism (particularly Presbyterianism), he reserved his strongest objections 
for Behemoth, almost as if he was unwilling to dilute the philosophic grandeur of Leviathan with 
obviously inferior prattle.  
Catholicism, on the other hand, was a more worthy opponent. Hobbes didn’t have to go 
twelve exhausting rounds with Rome as he did with the Protestant liberals, explaining authority, 
defining liberty, demanding obedience, forbidding dissent. The Church at Rome already 
appreciated undivided sovereignty. The Pope claimed to be monarch of the church, Vicar of 
Christ, supreme pastor, sole judge, infallible arbiter, and avenging magistrate (qualified to define 
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heresy and impose excommunication).
 71
 Hobbes had only one problem with this: all of these 
offices and functions, while entirely appropriate, belonged to his Civil Sovereign.
72
 Much of 
Leviathan is therefore simply an intramural spat between philosophic allies. 
Certain aspects of Roman Catholicism certainly irritated Hobbes more than others. He 
couldn’t stomach transubstantiation, for instance, so this doctrine is given almost immoderate 
emphasis throughout his discourse. At one point he even apologizes for his fixation “in a work of 
this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and 
Obedience.” But he could not ignore Catholicism’s unique power to change bread into God. 
“Who will not obey a Priest, that can make God, rather than his Sovereign?”73 Political 
insubordination is the real issue here, not transubstantiation. If the Civil Sovereign “make God,” 
Hobbes refuses to judge.
74
 He expects his own Sovereign to administer the Eucharist,
75
 and 
appears to have no problem with transubstantiation so long as the right man performs it.  
Among other petty frustrations, the self-serving ambition of the Catholic clergy galled 
Hobbes, and he frequently complains about the number of points necessary for salvation which 
are also “manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and his spiritual subjects.”76 On the other 
hand, he loudly celebrates the same attitude in his own Civil Sovereign, and praises monarchy 
for ingeniously reconciling the egocentric interests of Sovereignty with those of the governed.
77
 
Unperturbed by the obvious hypocrisy, Hobbes dryly admonishes, “To die for every tenet that 
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serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required,”78 another highly ironic statement 
given his own difficulties concerning military desertion of the Civil Sovereign. 
These minor objections are so shallow, sanctimonious, and immature that they might 
seem unworthy of Hobbes. But he succumbs to trivial bickering with Rome because 
fundamentally they have very little else to fight over. Protestantism was of an entirely different 
spirit, however. According to Hobbes, any so-called church which is not united under one 
Christian Sovereign “hath no authority at all.”79 He carefully defined “church” as “a company of 
men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one Sovereign,” which effectively 
disenfranchised all Protestant denominations except Anglican. “If Pastors be not subordinate to 
another, so as that there may be one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines, whereof 
both may be, and one must be false.”80 
For Hobbes and the Roman Catholic Church, authority resides in strength, and strength in 
unity, and unity in obedience to one Representative of God. Both parties heaped scorn upon the 
Protestant concept of “Scriptural authority,” and vehemently forbade any lay appeals to God’s 
Word over their own. “The question of the Authority of the Scriptures is reduced to this,” writes 
Hobbes, “Whether Christian Kings, and the Sovereign Assemblies in Christian Commonwealths, 
be absolute in their own Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, 
constituted over the Universal Church.”81 With this brusque gesture, Hobbes effectively 
dismissed all Protestant persuasions from the debate, including the Anglicans.
82
 In one 
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movement, he destroyed Sola Scriptura and submitted the very Word of God to the authority of 
man. 
Hobbes on Scripture, Law, and Education 
Lacking Rome’s greater delicacy on this matter, Hobbes parses with complete candor: 
“When we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from 
God himself, our Belief, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce 
therein…So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is 
drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is 
 aith in men only.”83 The Scripture exists because it was declared to be so by the authority of 
man, for “it is not the Writer, but the authority of the Church that maketh a book Canonical.”84 
The Church does not receive or acknowledge; the Church creates. Rome argued that the 
ecclesiastical magisterium had this power; Hobbes argued that civil sovereigns did.
85
  
 But either way, the Protestants were absolutely prohibited from appealing to God’s Word 
over Church authority, or otherwise locating “sovereignty” in Scripture. Martin Luther famously 
pleaded that his conscience was held captive by the Word of God (rather than ecclesiastical 
authority), in defense of his own dissenting interpretation of it. But Hobbes regards this 
sentiment to be irrational, illegal, and “repugnant to Civil Society.”86  or “if men were at liberty, 
to take for God’s Commandments, their own dreams, and fancies…scarce two men would 
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agree.”87 The vaunted Reformation right of individuals “to be judge of the meaning of Scripture” 
destroys “the peace of any Christian kingdom…It is this doctrine that divides a kingdom within 
itself.”88 The Church at Rome could certainly vouch for that. 
 Hobbes praises the Pope for withholding the Scriptures as long as he could, and for 
preventing the laity from interpreting the text. “ or after the Bible was translated into English, 
every man, nay, every boy and wench, that could read English, thought they spoke with God 
Almighty, and understood what he said, when by a certain number of chapters a day they had 
read the Scriptures once or twice over.”89 He splutters, “The Scriptures are hard,”90 and require 
authoritative interpretation, not the inadequate, indulgent, and dangerous musings of “private 
men.” He who is Sovereign should either interpret himself, or “authorize an Interpreter; whose 
Interpretation should generally be stood to.”91 And Hobbes doesn’t care if the Civil Sovereign 
authorizes Rome as interpreter, as long as the Pope understands that he is a hireling and a tutor.
92
  
 Hobbes appreciated the power of political theology. Men who clamor about “Sola 
Scriptura,” and imagine that they are governed by God’s Word rather than God’s Lieutenant, are 
the same men who draw from Aristotle’s Politics “that in a well ordered Commonwealth, not 
Men should govern, but the Laws.” Moreover, “ or a Private man…to Interpret the Law by his 
own Spirit, is another Error in the Politics,”93 eagerly seized upon by Protestants who 
demonstrate the same brazen proclivity with regard to Scripture. Aristotle’s Politics had only 
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fomented rebellion, bred dispute, and wrought devastating insurrection against undivided 
Sovereignty, to the great harm of all absolute monarchs, both ecclesiastical and secular.
 94
 
 But illiberal theology tends to “make the people the more obedient.”95 Hobbes knew to 
look toward the Church at Rome for an appropriate spirit of governance. The magisterium ruled 
the Church under their own monarch Pope and under no circumstances encouraged or permitted 
lay review of their sayings, actions, or authority. In codifying their sacred text, Rome essentially 
claimed authority over it, to interpret, to enforce, and to expand upon them with explanatory 
decrees and laws as may be necessary or expedient. To all these commands, Catholicism 
demanded of its people unqualified submission, and regarded all acts of disobedience, rebellion, 
or insubordination “heresy.”96 Hobbes denounced the Church at Rome for usurpation and fraud, 
but only because these powers, functions, and rights properly belonged to the realm of politics. 
In Leviathan, he shamelessly employs every single one of them. Hobbes insists that the 
Civil Sovereign has the authority to codify Natural Law
97
 with whatever decrees he thinks 
appropriate,
98
 to require simple obedience,
99
 and to prosecute disobedience as “heresy.”100 All 
laws “have need of Interpretation,”101 and “whosoever hath a lawful power over any Writing, to 
make it Law, hath the power also to approve or disapprove the interpretation of the same.”102 
Hobbes forbids any exercise of popular review, as if the legislative Sovereign might be required 
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to explain himself or otherwise defend his commands. His laws are just because they are simply 
his laws, there being no external, immaterial, invisible standard of “right,” “good,” “just,” or 
“godly” above and beyond his estimation of those qualities.103 There exists no appeal process to 
something higher –either to conscience, Natural Law, Scripture, or God himself. 
Disobedience is sin.
104
 To “dispute of Sovereign Power,” to dissent from monarchy, to 
question authority, to debate over law
105
 – these are dysfunctions which destroy the “real unity” 
of the body politic.  or the harmony of the commonwealth “is more than consent, or concord;” it 
is an almost sacred union, a “plurality of voices” speaking as one, a general will made up of 
those who voluntarily relinquish their selfish, individual interests, and submit them en masse to 
“that Mortal God” on earth who saves them from themselves. 106 Hobbes deliberately presents his 
secular commonwealth as a mystical (but corporate) body no less profound than that of Rome, 
and its betrayal at the hands of individual mavericks as moral tragedy and traitorous sacrilege. 
But so say all illiberal leaders. Their ordered schemes for society are often introduced in 
such a high pitched fervor of visionary utopia and with such blithe confidence in the good reason 
of the populace, that the incredible reality of popular dissent rapidly and irrevocably erases any 
aspect of benign generosity. The ungrateful intransigence of insubordinate individuals only 
confirms for illiberals a central tenet of their philosophy: single persons cannot be expected to 
understand what is good for them on their own – they must be told. Typical reeducation 
programs have two features: the first is negative, a strict censorship of objectionable materials 
                                                 
103
 Lev. 20:16/30:20  
104
 Lev. 27:1 
105
 Lev. 20:19/18:3/29:8/29:6 
106
 Lev. 17:13 
28 
 
which overtly undermine. And the second is positive, a targeted indoctrination on core 
principles, with strong emphasis on “obedience” and “submission.” 
Like any good illiberal, Hobbes bemoans the ignorance of the populace,
107
 but he also 
brightly suggests that people “are like clean paper, fit to…be imprinted” with whatsoever the 
Public Authority thinks best, rather than “scribbled over with the opinions” of subversive 
teachers.
108
 In order to prevent the latter scenario, Hobbes frequently proposes the systemic 
reform of the universities,
109
 including the selective censorship of specific authors and themes.
110
 
He urges the Civil Sovereign “to instruct men in the nature” of his Representative office and “the 
reasons of those his essential Rights,”111 and to “examine all the Doctrines of all books before 
they be published” in order to most efficiently control and shape the opinions of the people. “ or 
the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions.”112 
 or such mature illiberal communities, the concept of immediate “self-interest” takes a 
backseat to blind belief and obedience, whether justified by the evidence or not. “The People are 
to be taught…that they ought not to be in love with any form of Government they see in their 
neighbor Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in 
Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change.”113 They may also be prevented 
from deciding for themselves where they will live and work. Hobbes strongly discourages 
dependence upon the uncertain “Charity of private persons,” in favor of dependence upon Public 
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Authority, the seat of a control economy equipped to determine all industrial pursuits and 
appropriately allocate laborers toward them.
114
 
Individual initiative entails significant risk. But illiberal communities absorb that risk by 
transferring it to the shoulders of leadership. Central planners guarantee economic prosperity to 
each individual if they will only labor, produce, and distribute as directed. Political dictators 
guarantee social security to each individual if they will only yield and perform upon command. 
And religious clergy guarantee redemptive pardon to each individual if they will only submit to 
ecclesiastical supervision. Illiberalism demands obedience for protection, and dutiful 
subservience for security. But liberalism fosters the opposite attitude, because individual risk 
also implies individual responsibility, ownership, and reward. Men who ultimately answer for 
their own economic success, private safety, or religious weal generally exude a self-consciously 
independent disposition and may occasionally engage in ecclesiastical or civil disobedience. 
Hobbes to Schmitt 
Hobbes’ political philosophy is incompatible with virtually every Reformation motif. 
Along with their ancient Roman and Greek counterparts, Hobbes charged the Protestants with 
gross philosophic error regarding freedom, obedience, and sovereignty. But Catholicism was a 
different matter. Hobbes thoughtfully observed that “in the Church of Rome, the principal virtues 
are, to obey their doctrine…to be beneficial to the clergy…and to believe upon their word.”115 
He may have closed out his Leviathan caustically lampooning the Pope as Oberon, the fairy king 
of his own imaginary kingdom.
116
 But at least the Roman Church was a kingdom. At least the 
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Pope knew how to behave as a reputable sovereign, as a Vicar, as Prophet, Priest, and King. He 
demanded the sort of obedience that made Protestants protest and petulantly carry on about how 
that triad of mediatory roles were “fulfilled” and abolished in Christ. 
But Hobbes knew better. His Civil Sovereign was Prophet: for “whosoever in a Christian 
Commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his 
Commandments.”117 His Civil Sovereign was Priest: for “every Christian bishop is not only a 
bishop, but an archbishop…to whom God hath committed the charge of all the souls of his 
subjects.”118 And his Civil Sovereign was King – a monarch as of a Peculiar Kingdom, a 
“Sacerdotal Kingdom…a Kingdom of Priests…a Royal Priesthood…a Priesthood of Kings.”119 
This was no fairy kingdom, invisible diocese, spiritual sovereignty, or metaphysical might. 
Hobbes had poached Catholic authority and fortified it with real secular power. He triumphantly 
pronounced, “Every Christian Prince, as I have formerly proved, is no less Supreme Pastor of his 
own Subjects, than the Pope of his.”120 
Statements like these implied to German theorist Carl Schmitt that “Reformation and 
Counterreformation point in the same direction.”121 A devout Roman Catholic himself, Schmitt 
hopefully suggested that “Thomas Hobbes brought the Reformation to a conclusion,”122 but 
nothing could be further from the case. Hobbes wrote as a man out of his time, a relic of 
outmoded politics and traditionalist religion, a cranky conservative standing outside the whirl of 
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revolutionary fervor and shouting for it to stop. But the dizzying kaleidoscope of complementary 
protests spun faster, and the groundswell din of demands over religion, politics, and economics 
easily drowned out Hobbes’ reactionary warnings. The power which he wished to grant the State 
steadily became less plausible in inverse proportion to the growing strength of the Reformation.  
Henry VIII’s Act of Supremacy (1534) could have bestowed upon England’s Civil 
Sovereign the ecclesiastical authority which Hobbes would advocate, but in practice the potential 
ministerial functions were never realized. Henry seemed uninterested in anything more than 
official independence from bossy Rome. Mary completely overturned the Act (1554), and by the 
time Elizabeth readopted it in 1559, Protestantism had gained enough power to significantly 
nuance the title, locking away from the Civil Sovereign any true power over the ecclesiastical or 
doctrinal functions of any church.
123
 What Hobbes proposed in Leviathan (1651) had never 
really had its day, but the opportune moment for a strong monarchical “Vicar of Christ” was long 
over. England’s period of absolute secular sovereignty was also dwindling fast. 
Popularly attacked, ostracized, and ignored, Hobbes continued to bitterly prophesy that 
liberalism would surely ruin everyone’s chance for peace, freedom, and prosperity. He did not 
live long enough to behold the inevitable: a mass exodus of impassioned Protestants from the 
Commonwealth across the ocean to fully realize their reverence for ancient Greco politics. He 
did not see them proudly adopt republican “mixarchy,” or watch their efforts at promoting 
“liberty of conscience,” or endure their work ethic, or tolerate their deep obeisance to Adam’s 
Smith’s “invisible hand” as a governing principle. He would certainly never have predicted that 
in short order that dubiously founded community would become the most free, prosperous, and 
powerful nation in the world. 
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America was a unique case. No other nation had the opportunity to construct a new 
liberal order ex nihilo, ease its birth pangs, or coddle indulgently when liberalism faltered or 
froze. Most sovereign states struggled to gradually implement liberal reforms, hoping to avoid 
the utter devastation of a Peasants’ Revolt or Thirty Years’ War, but largely resigned to some 
amount of intermediate conflict, chaos, and rebellion. By the 20
th
 century, for better or worse, 
virtually all nations on the European continent had overthrown, marginalized, or constitutionally 
circumscribed their respective monarchies in favor of popularly elected, republican structures. 
Many of these transitions had not gone well, and a few left such dissatisfying vacuums of 
leadership and vision that they provoked a somewhat predictable rash of dictatorships. 
Germany’s Weimar Republic succumbed to this fate, and amongst the spate of angry 
jeremiads which mourned over ancient paths abandoned and foretold a day of reckoning, Carl 
Schmitt lifted his voice in protest of Protestantism along with its various political and economic 
manifestations. Many of his numerous theoretical essays are warmly written; they capture 
Schmitt’s real anguish, his pain, frustration, and dismay over the deteriorating condition of his 
fatherland. They also communicate his obvious pride in tradition, and particularly in the 
economic and political legacy of his faith, Roman Catholicism. Contrary to the modern spirit of 
indifference to doctrinal confession, Schmitt stubbornly maintained the political power of 
theology and insisted that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts.”124 
Schmitt on Political Theology 
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Monarch is king as God is king: this is the simplest analogy shared by religion and 
politics, and one which Schmitt does not deny.
125
 But the concept of political theology runs 
deeper than this obvious connection. It is “a polymorphous phenomenon…There are many 
political theologies because there are, on the one hand, many different religions, and, on the 
other, many different kinds and methods of doing politics.”126 Theology grapples with the same 
issues as politics (right and wrong, authority, freedom, law, governance, etc.), and also attempts 
to unpack man’s true nature with regard to reality, the method by which he knows anything, the 
authority which governs him, and the rationale by which it claims legitimacy. 
Schmitt argued that theology preceded modern politics, historically and conceptually
127
 – 
which is to imply a relationship of causation. Whether or not he comprehensively proves this 
point, Schmitt is far more successful establishing correlation between the two, and insightfully 
revealing the dynamic of interplay between them. This complex (and controversial) exercise 
demands skill, precision, and delicacy; Schmitt often appears ill-equipped for the task. His 
emotional demeanor ran hot – prone to sharply abrupt judgment as well as effusively credulous 
endorsement – and it is likely that he allowed his significant abilities as a jurist, philosopher, and 
theorist to be compromised by overweening disdain for his opponents, and handicapped by 
obvious partiality for one exclusive theology and its equally specific political counterpart.  
But this is actually Schmitt’s finest contribution to the field. The best evidence and 
example of “political theology” is that of Carl Schmitt’s own. His works progress from youthful 
religiosity to mature political discourse: The Visibility of the Church (1917), Political Theology 
(1922), Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923), Concept of the Political (1927), and The 
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Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (1938), among others. Schmitt completed his 
last book in 1970 – Political Theology II, another heavily theological work which reiterated his 
original premise. There is no doubting Schmitt’s sincerity on this matter, and the full body of his 
thought provides a fairly consistent and reliable pattern for all political perspectives organically 
drawn from doctrinal faith. 
Schmitt on Pessimism and Fear 
Schmitt’s theology begins with hell: people, being themselves and obeying themselves. 
This is also Thomas Hobbes’ hell, although he calls it the State of Nature. For both men, 
individualism always disturbs the peace, and creates an untenable climate of dysfunction, chaos, 
and fear. This last quality, however, is a redeeming grace, for it “drives anguished individuals to 
come together… A spark of reason flashes, and a consensus emerges about the necessity to 
submit to the strongest power.”128 Terror is a precious commodity for any illiberal, because it 
effectively justifies and legitimizes absolute authority. Security, order, peace, and unity – these 
become rewards for obedience and submission. If the requisite amount of fear has not already 
naturally gripped the populace, illiberal leaders often induce it. 
People have to feel a need for salvation. In religious circles, this need is derived from 
frequent references to man’s fallen state, his unrighteousness and impending doom. The severity 
of the predicament may be simply stated, it may be downplayed, or it may be embellished, 
depending on the doctrinal convictions or implicit aims of any given religious community. 
Calvinism, for instance, maintains man’s total depravity as a fundamental reality; Catholicism 
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does not. When a Roman Catholic emphasizes the “absolute sinfulness and depravity of human 
nature,”129 he is doing so polemically and rhetorically, knowing that a plummeting “fall from 
grace” grants a “will to world power. Like every worldwide imperialism that has reached its 
goal, the Church seeks to bring peace to the world.”130 
Schmitt is careful in his statements concerning humanity’s depravity. As a Catholic, he 
believed in the dogma of Original Sin, which “asserts not absolute worthlessness but only 
distortion, opacity, or injury, and leaves open the possibility of natural good.”131 “The freedom-
of-choice aspect prevails and weakens the doctrine of the radical evilness of man.”132 As an 
illiberal, however, Schmitt can’t help but admire the more incautious statements on this theme 
made by others. He approvingly references Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, who “knows that 
man is by nature evil and vile, a cowardly rebel who needs a master,”133 and devotes the last 
chapter of Political Theology to several counterrevolutionary Catholic philosophers who make 
Hobbes’ “nasty, brutish” imagery look like child’s play. 
Spanish theorist Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) takes the cake. “Humanity reels blindly 
through a labyrinth that we call history…a boat aimlessly tossed about on the sea and manned by 
a mutinous, vulgar, forcibly recruited crew.” He was at the time criticized by a few of his 
Catholic compatriots, who “voiced misgivings about his exaggeration of the natural evil and 
unworthiness of man.” And Schmitt certainly concedes: “What Donoso Cortés had to say about 
the natural depravity and vileness of man was indeed more horrible than anything that had ever 
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been alleged by an absolutist philosophy of the state in justifying authoritarian rule…He was 
even more horrified than a Puritan.”134 But Schmitt ultimately defends Cortés, because after all, 
rebellion (in this case anarchism) deserves stringent measures.  
Political exigency demands them. “As soon as Donoso Cortés realized that the period of 
monarchy had come to an end…He demanded a political dictatorship.” Schmitt acknowledges 
that by all normal standards, despotism is “not legitimacy.” But “in the face of radical evil the 
only solution is dictatorship.”135 The immediacy of extreme danger always reinforces Hobbes’ 
“eternal relation of protection and obedience” on which also rests the archaic feudal forms of 
“lord and vassal…patron and clients.”136 Liberalism generally recoils from these formulas and 
questions the crisis, or at least the solution. Schmitt tautly defined the essence of liberalism as 
“negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody 
battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended 
forever in everlasting discussion. Dictatorship is the opposite of discussion.”137 
Emergency situations call for decisive action – centralized, focused, and unencumbered 
by checks and balances or protests and debates. Even The Federalist admits as much: “The 
opposition of opinions and parties…are useful and necessary in the legislative; but not in the 
executive, where especially in times of war and disturbance actions must be energetic; to this 
belongs a unity of decision.”138 The American founders certainly assumed that these relevant 
periods of “disturbance” would be infrequent rather than perpetual, but illiberals like Thomas 
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Hobbes and Carl Schmitt had urgent ulterior motive to prolong the threat of emergency 
indefinitely. Defining the inalienable nature of man in terms of desperate warfare certainly 
creates this effect.  
Regarding all manifestations of innocuous disagreement as “chaos” also guarantees a 
permanent (if artificial) State of Emergency. By this reasoning, Schmitt frequently insinuates that 
individualism, pluralism, and even democracy are all potential crises of the commonwealth, and 
should be treated as such.
139
 For him, liberalism itself is a State of Emergency. But in the final 
analysis, Schmitt doesn’t care what scenario is considered dangerous, so long as an official State 
of Emergency is declared and expansive political powers are granted. Ideally, this assessment 
emanates voluntarily from the terrified populace,
140
 but realistically it is usually the state which 
decides whether the situation is critical enough to warrant emergency authority: “To the state as 
an essentially political entity belongs the jus belli, i.e. the real possibility of deciding in a 
concrete situation upon the enemy.”141 
Schmitt on Singular Authority 
Specifically, for Schmitt, one person ought to decide the “exception.” He does so at his 
own discretion, with no reference to established precedent, procedures, routines, or rules,
142
 
because the very nature of an exceptional situation frees him from normal modes and prescribed 
patterns. Schmitt delights in the exception – it is for him a weighty moment of decision and also 
of sovereignty, in which the entire political system realizes its chief end. He insists that the 
                                                 
139
 LST, 31,33,56-57 
140
 CP, 49 
141
 CP, 45 
142
 PT, 6-7 
38 
 
exception “confirms not only the rule but also [the rule’s] existence,” which is thus entirely 
derivative,
143
 an illogical statement unless it is interpreted in the light of Leviathan. Hobbes had 
all individuals voluntarily voting themselves out of the State of Nature. The mass election was 
obviously a truly communal decision,
144
 and in this sense the Commonwealth preceded and 
begot the Sovereign. 
But this implication could never stand with Hobbes; he vigorously denied that the 
Commonwealth had some existential being outside or before the creation of Sovereignty. The 
Civil Sovereign generated Commonwealth, not vice versa. And anyway, “if [the Sovereign] 
makes so many several Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the 
Sovereignty are void.”145 Schmitt likewise has the normative rule rely for its existence upon the 
exception, because in “the autonomous moment of the decision…the norm is destroyed in the 
exception.”146 This irrevocable decision point abolishes whatever once was regarded “norm” and 
installs a Sovereign who will shape a new norm, like phoenix rising from the ashes.  Only in this 
way can it be said that the rule is derived from the exception. 
Schmitt on Scripture and Law 
It is the exception which demands, decides, and fashions a sovereign – one who will rise 
to the challenge and reinstate order out of chaos, one who will also “decide on the exception.”147 
According to the same principle, the sovereign belongs to “the normally valid legal system,” he 
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stands outside it, and he also creates it.
148
 All of this sounds circular because it is. The arguments 
revolve in a tightly wound cycle, much like the question of Scriptural authority: the Church gives 
authority to the Bible, the Church interprets the Bible, the Bible gives authority to the Church, 
the Church gives authority to the Bible, and so on, ad infinitum. The primary aim, whether 
employed by Hobbes, Schmitt, the Roman Church, or any other illiberal, is to completely confine 
the governed within the coiled bounds of human and material authority.  
Round and round it goes with no escape: to appeal to a material code (to written law, for 
instance, or scripture) is merely to appeal to human authority which determines and interprets the 
code. “All law is ‘situational law.’ The sovereign…has the monopoly over the last decision.”149 
Catholicism reserves the same right: “It can deliberate as an equal partner with the state, and 
thereby create new law.”150 Both parties own and control their respective law; it does not own or 
control them.
151
 Schmitt categorically rejects all juristic scholarship which maintains the 
opposite: that the law is sovereign, independent of the state, ratified (not created) by authority, or 
intended to hold political power in check.
152
 He is particularly displeased by the notion that “we 
no longer live under the authority of persons, be that natural or artificial (legal) persons, but 
under the rule of laws, (spiritual) forces.”153 
Protestantism fosters this spirit by consistently asserting the sovereignty of God’s Word, 
its independence from the church, and its authoritative judgment over all Christians, pastors 
included. The Scripture itself, not the church, saves God’s people. St. Paul’s words to the ancient 
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church at Rome became a Reformation battle cry: “ aith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the 
word of God.”154 Salvation is not controlled, infused, administered, or otherwise bestowed by 
persons, and therefore ultimate reverence and obedience can never be due them. Illiberalism 
bristles at this reasoning, and whenever Thomas Hobbes quoted St. Paul, he was always careful 
to add a traditionally Catholic gloss: “ aith cometh by hearing, and hearing our Lawful 
Pastors.”155 The Word has no power on its own, inherently. 
And law does not exist in some Lockean realm of eternal spirituality, voluntarily 
apprehended and obeyed with heart, soul, and conscience. Roman Catholicism traditionally 
gravitates more toward an Aristotelian aesthetic rather than Platonic, because the Church 
embodies: “The concrete historical process of the incarnation of Christ is bound with the 
concrete present – the visible institution that bears the unbroken chain.”156 Physical, material, 
tangible, and objective realities ground Catholicism, in the same way that spiritual, immaterial, 
invisible, and subjective realities animate Protestantism. The dichotomy roughly corresponds to a 
“public” outlook on one hand, and a “private” on the other. Culturally and liturgically, the 
Catholic churches emphasize collective unity in the sacraments, while Protestant churches 
emphasize personal faith in the Word.  
The concepts of “private” and “personal” directly derive from that of transcendent 
authority. “Appealing to law can signify that a higher or better law, a so-called natural law or law 
of reason, is set against the law of the status quo.” Such appeals allow the governed to break free 
from the illiberal feedback loop of authority, and Schmitt praised Hobbes for forbidding them: 
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“He…emphasized time and again that the sovereignty of law means only the sovereignty of men 
who draw up and administer law. The rule of a higher order, according to Hobbes,” merely 
signified that “certain men of this higher order rule over men of a lower order.”157 All law, 
ecclesiastical or civil, is publicly codified, and “there are no points of departure for a right to 
resist, irrespective of whether it be an objective or a subjective right.”158 
Schmitt on Public and Private 
Leo Strauss didn’t read Leviathan this way; in his critical notes on Schmitt’s Concept of 
the Political he boldly portrayed Hobbes as a closet liberal – a man who allowed individuals to 
believe whatever they wanted, decide what was in their best interests, and resist rather than obey 
when the going got tough. Astonished and perplexed, Schmitt took a second look at Hobbes and 
then wrote his Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes as an indirect rejoinder to 
Strauss. To his chagrin, he had indeed discovered a “barely visible crack” in Hobbes’ otherwise 
ironclad approach, one which liberals would scrupulously exploit as Strauss had: the distinction 
between private and public. Apparently it did not matter to them that Hobbes had only allowed 
private belief as long as it remained truly remained private, i.e. never spoken about in public.  
With reactionary ruthlessness, Schmitt responded by completely abolishing the private. If 
given an inch, the liberals and Protestants invariably take a mile, something Hobbes had 
obviously failed to appreciate. The very separation of public and private automatically “drives 
inner belief into the private domain…The soul of a people betakes itself on the ‘secret road’ that 
leads inward.”159 Schmitt earnestly stressed “the importance of absorbing the right of private 
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freedom of thought and belief into the political system,”160 for to even admit the possibility of 
subjectivity is to plant “seeds of death” which destroy illiberal power. In this way Protestantism 
was able to single handedly shatter Christendom, and set in motion an inappropriate dynamic of 
decentralized individualism which quickly infected all aspects of society. 
Schmitt on Economics 
Schmitt tracks the inward proclivities of Protestantism, first from theology to economics: 
“Historically considered, ‘privatization’ has its origin in religion…If religion is a private matter, 
it also follows that privacy is revered.”  rom this viewpoint, “the unconditional guarantee of 
absolute private property can exist only where religion is a private matter, where it is…also the 
governing principle.”161 A passion for private anything is bad enough, but Schmitt also fumes 
over the stereotypical Protestant preoccupation economics. He wastes no time setting 
“economics” against “politics” and hastily pronouncing, “Economic thinking has its own reason 
and veracity in that it is absolutely material, concerned only with things. The political is 
considered immaterial, because it must be concerned with other than economic values.”162 
He paints Protestantism as “economic,” and therefore materialistic, while Catholicism 
represents “politics” and immaterial idealism – an odd judgment considering Protestantism’s 
philosophic retreat into the realm of the soul, and Catholicism’s fixations on physicality. The 
accusation appears to be one of “economic reductionism,” which more properly (and proudly) 
belongs to atheist communism, but Schmitt is insistent: “The materiality of economic-thinking 
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capitalists is very close to that of a radical communism.”163 In many ways, he actually prefers 
communism to capitalism, and this springs from a traditional Roman Catholic affinity for 
communitarianism.
164
 Redistributive command economies are collective rather than 
individualist, and they usually call for strong centralized authority, both aspects of which 
resonate with Catholicism. 
There’s something about capitalism which offends conservative Roman Catholicism, and 
it goes beyond “materialism.” The invisible hand of free-market economics is an audacious 
affront to illiberalism. It eschews visible, physical, personal intervention, and claims to serve the 
collectivity by fostering individualism rather than eradicating it. Capitalists have an almost 
religious faith in the inner workings of an invisible system they can’t control, and an incredible 
conviction in the virtue of personal selfishness, as if the good of the community will magically 
materialize from the combined contributions of a million self-absorbed interests. This economic 
thinking naturally proceeds from the same people who naively assume that an ideal political 
solution automatically springs from disputation, and a true interpretation of Scripture from the 
contradictory explanations of lay amateurs.  
Schmitt thunders, “An alliance of the Catholic Church with the present form of industrial 
capitalism is not possible.”165 The Church could never sanction a quasi-spiritual, individualist 
economic force which ticks along without human intervention and performs best under less 
authority rather than more. Early 20
th
 century Roman Catholic philosophy introduced a fresh 
new concept of “personalism,”166 with which Schmitt was certainly familiar – a modern religious 
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phenomenology which looked at first glance like a tentative foray into subjective individualism. 
More subtly, the groundbreaking movement merely distilled the traditional essence of Catholic 
understanding: persons are sacred. By this principle, Catholicism has always frowned upon the 
power of “forces,” “words,” or “things” over persons. 
Schmitt on Personal Representation 
According to this Catholic-infused argument, authority is personal, not impersonal. The 
law does not govern; people govern.
167
 Reason does not decide; people decide. Word does not 
represent; people represent. “The idea of representation is so completely governed by 
conceptions of personal authority that the representative as well as the person represented must 
maintain a personal dignity – it is not a materialistic concept. To represent in an eminent sense 
can only be done by a person.”168 Schmitt admits that liberalism also appropriates the term 
“representation,” by which it establishes a typically economic dynamic: politicians specialize in 
governance in order to allow the governed to specialize in other functions. They are merely hired 
“deputies,” subject to dismissal at any point.169 This representation bears almost no relation to 
the representation maintained by Catholicism and also employed by Hobbes.  
Radical representation takes upon itself an inalienable right and an absolute authority. To 
represent in this sense not simply to act on behalf of – it is also to embody profoundly, 
spiritually, and mystically, the way Adam transgressed for all humanity in the garden, the way 
Christ bore the sins of the world, the way Thomas Hobbes’ Civil Sovereign personally 
incorporates all the members of his commonwealth, and the way the Roman Catholic Church 
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personifies Christ and his body. “The political power of Catholicism rests…on the absolute 
realization of authority…It has the power of representation. It represents the civitas humana. It 
represents in every moment the historical connection to the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. 
It represents the Person of Christ Himself: God became man in historical reality.”170 
The Roman Catholic Church requires a very specific political form – a hierarchical 
monarchy – for “without it there is nothing to correspond to its intrinsically representative 
conduct.”171 According to Schmitt, the Church’s “greatest achievement” resides in “having made 
priesthood into an office – a very distinctive type of office. The pope is…the Vicar of 
Christ…He is not the functionary and commissar of republican thinking…His position is not 
impersonal, because his office is part of an unbroken chain linked with the personal mandate and 
concrete person of Christ.”172 This radical representation points in both directions; the pope 
represents Christ to his people, and represents his people to Christ. As in all illiberal thought, 
individuals within the community are not encouraged to interact with God directly. 
They need mediation. Unlike the Protestant formula of “once for all” mediation – the 
finality of Christ’s atonement in which all other mediations cease and God’s people can 
subsequently seek his face directly – Catholic mediation “must be regenerated constantly…The 
unity of God assumes the form of a legal succession in the historicity of a mediation through 
mortal man, because only in this way could it be made visible in time. One God. One Church.”173 
This idea of corporate unity follows from that of mediation, and simultaneously undermines the 
power of individuality. “Man is not alone in the world…He is in the company of other men. 
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Thus he remains in his relation to God in the community and its mediation…A man totally 
dedicated to God is as little an individual as one totally immersed in the mundane world.”174  
Schmitt on Unity and Truth 
The collectivity “always retains its unity, because God is also only one.”175 All types of 
division or private right of dissent annihilate this image of oneness, the physical and visible 
manifestation of which is more important than the truth itself. “Everyone claims, of course, that 
right and truth is on his side. But the assertion of being in the right does not lead to peace.”176 It 
leads instead to war – the “bellum omnium contra omnes. But sovereignty (and thus the state 
itself) resides in deciding this controversy.”177 Order and harmony, without which the collectivity 
cannot flourish, proceed from authority, “not, as in the rationalist conception of the law in 
Rechtsstaat theories, truth and justice: Auctoritas, non Veritas facit legem…To an absolutist it is 
obvious.”178 
For Schmitt, and perhaps also for Hobbes, only one Sovereign can properly communicate 
unity and truth. “In the struggle of opposing interests and coalitions, absolute monarchy made the 
decision and thereby created the unity of the state. The unity that a people represents does not 
possess this decisionist character.”179 It is the form of monarchy, of undivided sovereignty, a 
corporate head, a visual symbol of representation,
180
 a mediation, and an “unicum sui generis, 
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with a monopoly of power ‘mystically reproduced,’”181 which Thomas Hobbes adopts for his 
“immense person” and earthly god.182 Schmitt triumphantly pronounced, “If a Christian obeys 
authority because it is grounded in and bound by God, he obeys God and not authority. This is 
the only revolution in world history that deserves to be called great – Christianity provided a new 
foundation for mundane authority.”183 
Perhaps it took a conservative Roman Catholic to fully appreciate Hobbes’ vision, but 
after the 1960s it became more difficult to say so. Vatican II subtly but discernibly capitulated 
toward Protestantism, liberalism, and capitalism, inducing dismayed chagrin from traditionalist 
quarters within the Church. Carl Schmitt dedicated his last book Political Theology II to Catholic 
theologian Hans Barion, an outspoken critic of Vatican II. Barion had previously offered “a 
crystal-clear analysis” of Schmitt’s youthful Roman Catholicism and Political Form, which he 
called “an Elogium” to Catholic power. But according to Barion, Vatican II had taken away the 
basis for Schmitt’s eulogy: “The time for Roman ecclesiastical triumphalism is over, and the 
glorious pomp of a form of power that impacted on the history of the world” is now defunct.184 
A Few Words on Illiberal Theology 
Neither Barion nor Schmitt could accept the fact that the Roman Catholic Church was not 
an inherently illiberal institution, any more than Christianity was an inherently illiberal religion. 
The abstract conception of “illiberalism” transcends religion, economics, and politics. Like 
“liberalism,” it flexibly adapts in almost any social environment without shedding its 
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distinguishing marks. No matter the institution, culture, discipline, or venue, illiberal politics 
looks a certain way, as does illiberal economics, and illiberal religion. When we speak broadly 
about any of them, we attest to a larger theoretical framework, a basic template which can be 
applied in a myriad of scenarios and circumstances. “Political theology” follows this same 
pattern. Certain variable features can be isolated from liberal or illiberal manifestations in order 
to construct descriptive template. 
Simply from this brief analysis on Hobbes and Schmitt, it is possible to argue that 
“illiberal theology” generally entails: 
1. Sovereignty in God’s representatives. Transcendent deity is either hidden, far 
away, or otherwise inaccessible. The power and authority of God manifests itself 
in human form. Politically, this means that natural law (or any other form of 
transcendent “right”) is either hidden, confusing, or otherwise inaccessible. The 
power and authority of natural law manifests itself in human form. 
2. Priesthood of elites. Religious leaders intercede directly to Deity on behalf of the 
laity. Individuals cannot directly appeal to Deity for their own salvation. 
Politically, this means that political leaders engineer social, economic, and 
political good for the governed so that they don’t have to. Individuals cannot 
appraise, pursue, or acquire their own good for themselves. 
3. Obedience to interpreters. The sacred text is important, but not nearly as 
important as its interpretation. Only the religious elites interpret. Politically, this 
means that the law is important, but not nearly as important as its interpretation. 
Only the political elites interpret. 
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4. Unity over truth. Disputes over truth rend the visible unity of the religious 
community and therefore are prohibited. The religious elites pronounce on truth. 
Politically, this means that disputes over social, economic, and political goods 
rend the visible unity of the state and therefore are prohibited. The political elites 
pronounce on social welfare. 
These core tenets of illiberal theology transcend Christianity; they can be discovered in 
many religions, particularly in those which hold a text sacred and therefore leave open the 
possibility of interpretive control. In many cases, illiberal theology will struggle with liberal 
theology within the same religion, as in the case of Christianity during the Reformation and its 
aftermath. Protracted tension may even turn violently physical (especially if illiberalism is 
entrenched) and almost always coincides with equally momentous social and political change. In 
the current scientific research on the various preconditions of democracy and liberalism, the 
effect of religion on politics often attracts considerable attention, as it should; the correlation is 
valid and of great import. 
Unfortunately much of this research measures and tests religion on an inadequate or 
incomplete scale. The usual indicators of “religious affiliation” and “church attendance,” for 
instance, generally can’t capture those aspects of religion which have most political relevance, 
making it all the more remarkable when these methods do actually dredge up something of 
serious statistical significance. If polled, Thomas Hobbes would register as an Anglican (or if 
many political theorists had their way, as unaffiliated, agnostic, or atheist); Carl Schmitt would 
list Roman Catholic. Neither man probably did much in the way of consistent church attendance. 
The fact that both were deeply religious in their own way, that their theological convictions so 
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profoundly influenced their political perspectives, and that they thought completely alike – very 
little of this would record on a typical political survey.  
The more complex dichotomy between liberal and illiberal theology is much more 
promising as a political indicator, but it requires more care. It might be useful for political 
scientists to develop new strategies for the collection of data on religious conviction. For 
instance, poll and survey questions could be better framed to ascertain philosophic preference, 
not simply formal affiliation. In an earlier confessional era, official creeds, denominational 
association, and parish participation provided a more straightforward and reliable testimony 
about an individual’s religious, social, and political bent. The modern period of private 
religiosity and spiritual introspection does not typically yield the same concrete results with 
either consistency or precision.  
Finally, it is important to note that both liberalism and illiberalism have a theology. 
Illiberal theology manifests itself in an overtly visible, physical, and corporate manner; its 
political counterpart exerts the same aggressively palpable presence, and political illiberalism 
loudly appeals to its correspondent theology with transparent directness. Schmitt admits that 
illiberal politics cannot “survive even a generation with only naked techniques of holding power. 
To the political belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority 
without an ethos of belief.”185 John Locke also questioned whether illiberalism could possibly 
maintain such overweening authority without some other ideological or theological assist, and 
Thomas Hobbes’ work certainly illustrates this point with poignant clarity.  
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But conversely, it is not accurate to assume that liberalism does not therefore need (or 
positively renounces) religion and theology. The doctrinal foundations of liberalism gravitate 
toward that which is quietly private, inward, and invisible; its political counterpart draws from 
these theological reserves in a similarly unobtrusive fashion. “No king but King Jesus” is a 
theological statement; even “Politics has no theology” is a theological statement, as Schmitt 
insightfully showed. But whatever it be, liberalism needs religious conviction, a sure moral 
authority, and a collective theology with as much urgency as illiberalism, lest the community be 
completely shattered in heedless individualism.  
God is not on one side, liberal or illiberal; he is clearly on both. Liberalism foolishly errs 
when it denies or even neglects its own theology. If nothing else, liberalism could use it 
negatively, to rebut and defeat or at least cast a shadow of reasonable doubt over illiberal 
theology. And in a positive sense, religion has always and will continue to powerfully animate 
and strengthen politics; if the “priesthood of kings” disposes a commonwealth to greater 
obedience, then a “priesthood of all believers” can likewise impel individuals to stronger 
involvement and informed political participation, as it always has. When liberalism is ready to 
rediscover its theological roots, in an ironic twist, it will be illiberal works such as Leviathan and 
Political Theology which will certainly point the way, clear the path, and provide the pattern. 
 
